



IN OECD COUNTRIES – AN
INSTITUTIONS CLIMATE
INDEX
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OLIVER RÖHN*
The Penn World Tables document dramatic differ-
ences in development among OECD countries. The
per capita income gap between richest and poorest
OECD countries was about 8 fold in 1970, and
remains about 5 fold in 2000. Despite evidence in
favor of convergence, such significant and persistent
disparities are surprising. They raise interest in the
determinants of the diversity of per capita income
levels among the group of countries that is widely
considered as “first world”, “advanced” and “indus-
trialized.”
The recent literature on development accounting,
which seeks to explain differences in per capita
income levels, is separated into approaches that
examine the contribution of either production factors
or institutions. In his survey for the Handbook of
Economic Growth, Caselli (2005) shows that factors
of production explain only about half of the variation
in per capita income. This production-factor based
strand of the growth literature typically does not pre-
sent an explanation as to why large differences in fac-
tor accumulation may exist across countries, or to
what extent the underlying causes for the differences
may rest in differences of economic policy and insti-
tutional design. It may not be surprising that 5 to 8
fold differences in per capita income across OECD
countries cannot be explained solely by differential
factor accumulation or technical change.
Alternatively, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005, also for the Handbook of Economic Growth)
survey a voluminous literature that supports the
hypothesis that economic institutions explain signif-
icant portions of the observed differences in per
capita incomes. This literature also uses the terms
“economic institutions,” “structural policies,”
“growth promoting policies,” and “social infrastruc-
ture.” Below we simply refer to “institutions,”
although Persson (2005) highlights that the litera-
ture’s focus on institutions often associates identical
measures with different labels.Hall and Jones (1999)
use “social infrastructure,” Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2005) refer to “economic institutions,”
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, (2004) simply say
“institutions,” while Persson (2005) uses “growth
promoting policies” or “structural policies.” All of
these terms are used to refer to identical or very sim-
ilar fundamental data.
Besides explaining differences in per capita income,
institutions have also been shown to account for
variations in observed cross country growth rates.
The institutions based literature on economic
growth originates with the seminal work of Douglas
North and Robert Thomas, who observed that the
factors such as capital accumulation or innovation
“are not causes of growth; they are growth” (North
and Thomas,1973,p.2;italics in the original).Eicher,
Garcia-Penalosa and Teksoz (2006) explore this
hypothesis in a global cross-section to find that,
indeed,institutions crucially moderate the returns to
factor accumulations across countries. While the
empirical growth literature has settled on a large
number of variables that seem to be robustly related
to growth in the global sample,Eicher,Papageorgiou
and Roehn (2007) show that popular growth
datasets do not contain the crucial regressors neces-
sary to identify the growth determinants in OECD
countries. Since global datasets are in a sense based
on the lowest common denominator in terms of data
collection, it is not surprising that they do not con-
tain key growth determinants for advanced coun-
tries, such as R&D intensity, productivity of govern-
ment investment, tertiary education, etc (for which
no developing country data is available). In this
paper we therefore seek to develop a dataset that
focuses squarely on OECD countries to identify the
drivers of economic performance that determine the
fortunes of high income countries specifically.
Our task is then to examine whether a set of institu-
tions can be isolated among OECD countries that
contributes either directly or indirectly to the
observed income differences among advanced coun-
tries. The focus on OECD countries is admittedly
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arbitrary.Alternative analyses might be based on the
World Banks’ group of “high income countries,” or
the group of countries that rank among the top 30 in
terms of per capita income.The two latter approach-
es, however, do not generate one stable set of coun-
tries, as membership in these groups varies over
time. Since our goal is panel analysis we therefore
adopt the OECD definition.1
The empirical literature on the non-institutional
determinants of growth in OECD countries has
developed substantially over the past two decades,
drawing on a growing number of databases. One
group of papers is comprised of studies that replicate
basic global cross country studies with the sub-sam-
ple of OECD countries. Such studies often do not
perform well as seen in Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992) or in Englander and Gurney (1994), who
attempt either Solow or Barro style exercises for
OECD countries with very limited success.
Subsequent attempts depart from a global analysis
focused on OECD specific characteristics (and data)
and perform better. Lee (1995) and Alexander (1997)
find that private investment,government consumption
/ debt, and inflation are significant in Barro (1991)
style OECD growth regressions. Park (1995) shows
the importance of intellectual property rights in
OECD countries, and Kneller et al. (1999) find signif-
icant effects of tax distortions and productive govern-
ment expenditures on growth in OECD countries.
These results were put into question by Mendoza et al.
(1997) who reports that taxes on consumption, labor,
capital, and personal income are not statistically sig-
nificant determinants of growth in OECD countries.
In terms of institutional analysis,Eicher and Leukert
(2005) show that, once endogeneity is appropriately
taken into account, a small subset of institutional
variables is indeed strongly related to economic per-
formance in both the OECD and Non-OECD sam-
ple. However, their measure of institutions is rather
narrow, and they find that institutional regressors
have a 70 percent smaller impact in OECD countries
as compared to Non-OECD countries. This raises
the question whether the right set of institutions was
considered for the OECD sample.
Alternative approaches to institutions, or structural
policies and growth in OECD countries include Ahn
and Hemmings (2000), Bassanini, Scarpetta and
Hemmings (2001) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2006). Reviewing the empirical evidence on growth
in OECD countries Ahn and Hemmings (2000) find
a negative link between hyper-inflation and growth
and positive links between financial development,
trade, pro-competition policy and economic perfor-
mance. Bassanini et al. (2001) investigate the effect
of policies on economic performance to find that
both high inflation, the variance of inflation, direct
taxes and government transfers have a direct nega-
tive effect. Their results also suggest that the devel-
opment of financial markets and R&D spending are
positively related to growth. Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003),Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) and Scarpetta et
al. (2002) analyze the impact of product and labor
market institutions on multi-factor-productivity
(MFP) in OECD countries in a cross-section but
they do not establish a link to economic growth.Our
approach is to examine the impact of institutions on
OECD growth that is not limited to labor markets or
policy variables. We include a broad spectrum of
institutions that might influence economic perfor-
mance. We will discuss the breath of these institu-
tions below.
We do limit ourselves to assessing the relevance of
institutions for OECD economic performance and
develop an array of endogenously selected and
weighted economic indicators that are combined
into one aggregate index of institutional quality in
OECD countries (Institutions Climate Index).2 This
Index can be used to quantify and compare the rela-
tive institutional quality across OECD countries.
Further, we discuss how the index can be used to
understand differential economic performances of
OECD countries.
The Data 
The central purpose of the Institutions Climate
Index is to assess the extent to which individual
OECD countries possess the institutional quality to
achieve economic growth. To this end we seek to
identify a set of institutional variables that can be
robustly related to economic performance in OECD
economies. The aim of the Index is to summarize a
1 For the narrow set of institutions considered in Eicher and
Leukert (2005), results hold for alternative definitions of advanced
countries.
2 Like most other composite indices our index follows a linear
aggregation rule.A feature of this type of aggregation rule is that a
decrease in one sub-index can be compensated by an increase in
one or several other sub-indices. This might be viewed as undesir-
able since it follows, that the index cannot address questions relat-
ing to the sequencing of or the interdependencies among institu-
tional reforms.country’s institutional performance in several dis-
tinct growth-relevant dimensions that capture over-
all institutional quality.A key feature of the index is
that all components are selected and weighted based
on their predictive power.
In early work on the influence of institutions on
growth, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) applied the
Gastil’s indexes of civil and political rights to find a
statistically significant indirect effect of the index on
growth (via investment).One can only speculate that
endogeneity problems of institutions overwhelmed
the explanatory power of the explanatory variables
to wash out any direct effect. The seminal paper on
the institutions and growth literature is Mauro
(1995), who employs carefully chosen proxies and
econometric techniques to identify a significant neg-
ative direct effect of corruption on investment and
growth, while more efficient bureaucracies and the
rule of law are shown to influence growth positively.
The long line of papers that follow Mauro (1995) all
use variables derived from institutional quality data
that is provided by risk-rating agencies (Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Business
Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), and
Business International), usually with similar results.
Most notably, Knack and Keefer (1995) and Knack
(1996) use the ICRG security of contract and prop-
erty rights institutional indices in growth regressions
to find effects on growth.Barro (1996) uses the ordi-
nal ICRG and the earlier BERI indices of property
rights with an endogenous rule of law index (dated
1982).He finds a consistently positive and significant
effect on growth. Barro (1996) also uses Gastil’s
political rights index and finds that the middle level
of democracy most favors growth as he discovered
that a curvilinear relationship between growth and
the Gastil index exists. Alesina et al. (1996) find a
negative effect of government instability on growth
and Easterly (1993) indicates negative effects from
financial repression. Barro (1996) and Helliwell
(1994) also find that the Freedom House indexes
were positively related to growth only if variables
such as educational attainment and investment rates
are omitted as explanatory variables. The authors
concluded that any beneficial impacts of democracy
on growth may operate through the factor accumu-
lation channels.
A survey of the literature by Aron (2000) yields no
less than 41 empirical papers that utilize indices of
institutional quality. This entire literature bases its
results, however, on a global sample of between
80 and 110 countries,mixing countries both develop-
ing and developed and attempting to explain the
influence of institutions with about 5 to 10 institu-
tional variables.3 Aron (2000) also documents that
none of the papers surveyed focuses on OECD or on
strictly European indices as determinants of eco-
nomic performance.The similar survey by Acemoglu
et al. (2005) documents the same fact.
A priori one might expect that the type of institu-
tions that drive growth in developed countries are
not identical to the relevant ones in developing
countries.Thus, replicating global growth studies for
OECD countries and examining this a priori
assumption is a natural first step.Eicher and Leukert
(2005) show that, if the global sample of the seminal
Hall and Jones (1999) paper is split into developing
and OECD countries, the significance of the estab-
lished institutional variables (e.g., corruption, risk of
expropriation) vanishes for the OECD sample. This
may not be a surprising result, given the nature of
the institutional variables included.
The result does raise the stakes, however, to deter-
mine whether relevant institutional variables exist
which do indeed influence economic performance in
OECD countries. Our research seeks to expand the
institutional variables under consideration in the
existing institutions and growth literature to include
broader categories of institutions. Each category is
comprised of a set of detailed sub-indices and com-
ponents that are presumably relevant for OECD
countries. For example, Barro’s (1991) measure of
political instability using observations on revolu-
tions, coups and assassinations is likely to be an
insignificant explanatory variable in the OECD sub-
sample, whereas the number of government changes
might turn out to be more appropriate.
We took a broad view of institutions and included all
factors that reflect institutions and structural policies
that have been related in the growth literature to
economic outcomes.This comprehensive data collec-
tion effort resulted in a database of more than a hun-
dred institutional indicators. However, we did not
want to restrain ourselves to an index that relates to
a single cross section of countries, instead we decid-
ed to base the Index on indices that provide infor-
mation not only across countries, but also across
time. The time series requirement renders a dataset
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Table 1 
Candidate Variables andSources 
Categories Sub-Indices Components
1. Constitutional 1.1 Democratic System Institutionalized democracy (Polity)
system Institutionalized autocracy (Polity)
Competitiveness of executive recruitment (Polity)
Openness of executive recruitment (Polity)
Competitiveness of political participation (Polity)
Regulation of participation (Polity)
Regulation of chief executive recruitment (Polity)
Executive recruitment (Polity)
Political competition (Polity)
Democratic accountability (ICRG) 
1.2 Political Stability Government stability (ICRG)
Regime durability (Polity)
Multiple terms inoffice (DPI) 
1.3 Civil Liberties Political  rights  (Freedom House)
Civil liberties (Freedom House)
1.4 Checks and Con- Legislative index of electoral competitiveness (DPI)
straints  Checks/number of veto players (DPI) 
Political constraints indices (Witold Henisz) 
Ethnic tensions (ICRG) 
2. Social conflict 2.1 Conflict External conflict (ICRG)
 potential Internal conflict (ICRG) 
Religious tensions (ICRG)
Military in politics (ICRG)
2.2 Military in Politics Chief executive a military officer (DPI)
3. Administrative 3.1 Basic Institutional Property rights &legal structure  (EFW)  
and judicial Quality Law&order (ICRG)  
 quality Corruption  (ICRG)
Bureaucratic quality (ICRG) 
Legal/administrative restrictions (WES)  
Political stability (WES)  
Confidence in government economic policy (WES)
4. Economic in- 4.1 Optimal Taxation Top marg. tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) (EFW)
stitutions Tax wedge (including employer’s soc. sec. contributions) (OECD)
Income tax rate (average rate in %) (OECD)
 4.2  Fiscal Burden Total tax revenue (% GDP) (OECD)
4.3 Trade Openness Black market premium (EFW)
Tariffs  (EFW)
Trade size (actual size of trade sector compared to expected) (EFW)  
 4.4Capital Markets  Credit market regulations  (EFW) 
International capital market controls (EFW)
Private sector domestic credit (% of GDP) (World Bank) 
4.5 Labor Markets  Labor market regulations (EFW) 
Early retirement index, male (OECD)
Female labor force participationrate (World Bank)
Long term unemployment rate (OECD)
4.6 Structure of Go- Government consumption spending (% of total consumption) (EFW)
vernment Expendi-
 tures 
Government enterprises and investment (% of total investment)
(EFW) 
5. Educational 5.1 Human Capital Primary gross enrolment rate (World Bank)
system Efficiency Secondary gross enrolment rate, (World Bank)
Tertiary gross enrolment rate (World Bank)
Average years of schooling (World Bank)
Public educational expenditure (World Bank)
6. Social system 6.1 Social Expenditure Old age expenditure (OECD)
Family expenditure (OECD) 
Active labor market program expenditure (OECD)
6.2 Health System Public health expenditure (OECD)
Infant mortality (OECD)
Life expectancy at age 0 (OECD)
7. Innovationpo- 7.1 Patents and Cita- ICTpatents at EPO (OECD)
tential tions Biotechnology patents at EPO (OECD)
Scientific/technical journal articles per 1000 pop (World Bank)
Notes: DPI: Beck et al. (2001), EFW: Fraser Institute (2006), ICRG (2006), Polity: Polity IV Project (2004), Witold
Henisz (2000, 2002), WES: Ifo World Economic Survey (2007).to 61 possible variables that are available in 5-year
moving averages over the time period 1988–2004 for
24 OECD countries.4 We sort the indices into
7 broad categories that pertain to i) constitutional
system,ii) social conflict potential,iii) administrative
and judicial quality,iv) economic institutions,v) edu-
cational system vi) social system, and vii) innovation
potential. Each of the seven categories is in turn
comprised of several sub-indices. Table 1 lists the
variables that were considered as candidates for the
analysis.
The variables represent both expert assessments
regarding the quality of the institutional environ-
ment as well as objective coding of institutional qual-
ity. All indicators originate from reliable sources
such as the World Bank, the OECD, the
International Risk Country Guide (ICRG) and the
Fraser Institute. Novel is our inclusion of previously
unused institutional data from the World Economic
Survey (WES) of the Ifo Institute for Economic
Research, Munich. WES data has been available
since 1992 and surveys different dimensions of the
economic environment,such as “Lack of Confidence
in Government’s Economic Policy”, “Political
Instability” and “Legal and Administrative Restric-
tions for Foreign Firms to Invest in this Country
and/or to Repatriate Profits”.
Methodology
In this section we outline which variables are includ-
ed in the index, why and with which specific weight.
A key problem in the institutions literature is that
the large number of possible candidate regressors
quickly leads the number of regressors to exceed the
number of observations. In addition, multicollineari-
ty is often rampant within a specific category.Finally,
several indicators might proxy for the same institu-
tion. In contrast to capital and labor, institutions are
not directly measurable.Thus,research into the insti-
tutional determinants of economic performance has
to make use of indicators that proxy for specific vari-
ables of interest.This may cause identification prob-
lems due to the fact that distinct variables may proxy
for similar institutions.
One can begin to address these issues by aggregating
variables with similar interpretations into separate
categories. The standard procedure in the literature
(see survey by Aron, 2000) is to average or sum
indices – implicitly subjectively assigning equal
weight to all variables chosen to be included in the
analysis. In contrast to studies that weigh variables
ex ante by assigning identical or arbitrary weights,
we employ Factor Analysis (FA) to generate
weights.5
We therefore present a simple, but important exten-
sion of Hall and Jones (1999) to construct institu-
tional indices. Their work gave rise to an extensive
literature on growth and development accounting
based on institutional data. Our addition is that the
regressors are weighted by their relevance, taking
into account similarities between regressors. Factor
Analysis addresses the variable identification issue
by reducing the dimensionality of the dataset.Factor
Analysis returns the smallest number of linear com-
binations of regressors that spans a similar dataspace
as all candidate regressors. The linear combinations
are commonly called factors. We employ Factor
Analysis in a two-step procedure. In the first step,
several candidate regressors (components) that are
all suspected to proxy for a similar institutional
proxy (such as political stability) are combined
under one sub-index heading (see Table 1).All vari-
ables in one sub-index are then subjected to Factor
Analysis, which establishes the linear dependencies
among candidate regressors. In the second step, we
perform Factor Analysis on all sub-indices that
belong to one category heading (see Table 1). As is
common practice we restrict ourselves in both steps
to those factors with an eigenvalue greater than
unity to span the matrix of independent variables as
efficiently as possible. The informational content of
each component in a sub-index and each sub-index
in a category is reflected by the weight that is
assigned in the linear combination. Hence, the
weights are specified by the data and not by the
researcher.
After reducing the dimensionality of the indepen-
dent variables,we analyze how many factors are eco-
nomically relevant in determining economic perfor-
mance in OECD countries, hence the factors are
regressed on GDP per capita growth rates.Instead of
focusing on an index that relates to a single cross sec-
tion of countries, we decided to base the Index on
information not only across countries,but also across
time. Thus, we regress the factors on the average
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GDP per capita growth rate on three cross sections
1994, 1998, 2002. To smooth cyclical movements we
employ 4-year average GDP p.c. growth rates as our
dependent variable. Hence the first cross section
relates to the average growth rate of 1990 to 1994,
the second to 1994 to 1998 and the third to 1998 to
2002. To account for the fact that institutions are
seen to lead growth, we use two-year lags of each
institutional factor as independent variables.
To establish economic relevant sub-indices, only
those factors were retained that proved to exhibit
significant explanatory as well as predictive power.
Specifically, we retained only those factors whose
coefficient estimate’s t-value exceeds unity and
therefore improves the regression. This procedure
resulted in a set of factors that are able to explain 44
percent of the variation in per capita GDP growth
rates. The factor coefficient estimates together with
the weights of each sub-index in a factor were then
used to establish the impact of each sub-index on the
aggregate institution index. Finally, the weights of
each component in a sub-index could be employed
to calculate the influence of each institutional vari-
able on the overall Institutions Climate Index.
Composition of the Institutions Climate Index
The result of the factor and regression analysis is one
aggregate institution index that is composed of 8 dis-
tinct institutional sub-indices. Figure 1 displays the
sub-indices and their contribution to the overall
Institutions Climate Index. Each sub-index is again
comprised of several components (Figures A1-8).We
will describe each of the selected indicators in
greater detail below.
All components are aggregated into one Index score
for each country.We normalize the index such that it
ranges from zero to unity.To do so, each of the com-
ponents is normalized to range from 0 to unity
according to:
where Ci,t is the value of the component of country i
at time t. Min(Ci,t) and Max(Ci,t) are the minimum
and maximum sample values of each variable Ci,t.6
The overall Index is then the weighted sum of all
normalized components. The weights of each sub-
index in the final index are shown in Figure 1, while
Figures A1-8 display the weights for the components
in each sub-index. A score of 0 (1) indicates that a
country received the minimum (maximum) score
observed within the entire sample in all components.
This normalization procedure assures comparability
of the Index over time.
Optimal Taxation 
With 21.2 percent, Optimal Taxation carries the
largest weight, due to its large statistical and eco-
nomic contribution to the overall index. This sub-
index assigns low values to countries with either
insufficiently low or excessively high tax rates. The
intuition is that taxes have a nonlinear effect on
growth.A certain quantity of tax revenues is neces-
sary for growth to provide, for example, productivi-
ty enhancing infrastructure investments. However,
excessive tax rates deter private
investment. This idea was first
formalized in an endogenous
growth framework by Barro
(1990). Figure A1 shows the
components of the Optimal
Taxation sub-index and their
individual respective contribu-
tions. Tax wedge measures
employees’ and employers’
social security contributions and
personal income tax less transfer
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6 The choice of sample dependent mini-
mum and maximum values in contrast to
absolute minima and maxima was due to
the fact that for some variables no
absolute maxima (e.g. average years of
schooling) or meaningful absolute mini-
ma exist (e.g. gross enrolment rates).payments as percentage of gross labor costs.The top
marginal tax rate assigns higher ratings to countries
with lower marginal tax rates that take effect at
higher income thresholds (Fraser Institute 2006).
The squared tax component captures the non-linear
relationship between the tax rates and growth as
outlined by Barro (1991). Since the linear and non-
linear components cannot be meaningfully separat-
ed, we only provide discussion of this sub-index as
a whole.
Basic Institutional Quality
A close second in terms of importance is the Basic
Institutional Quality sub-index with 21 percent.
Basic Institutional Quality closely resembles the
original index of government anti-diversion policies
employed in Hall and Jones (1999). It measures the
extent to which the government protects individuals
from diverting resources into unproductive uses
through e.g. protection of property rights, law and
order enforcement, impartial courts or bureaucratic
quality or how the government themselves acts as a
diverter for example through corruption.
The Basic Institutional Quality sub-index is com-
prised of 7 components (Figure A2). The first com-
ponent measures how political stability influences
the climate for foreign investors. Bureaucratic quali-
ty captures the institutional strength that minimizes
revisions of policy when governments change.
Therefore, high points are given to countries where
the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to
govern without drastic changes in policy or interrup-
tions in government services (ICRG 2006).
Law&order assesses the strength and impartiality of
the legal system and the observance of the law.
Countries that enjoy a high law&order rating exhib-
it sound judicial systems and legal enforcement with
effective sanctions (ICRG 2006). The component
property rights&legal structure contains valuations of
judicial independence,impartial courts,protection of
intellectual property, military interference in rule of
law and the political process and the integrity of the
legal system (Fraser Institute 2006). A further com-
ponent is the assessment of a country’s level of cor-
ruption. Finally the last two subcomponents are sur-
vey questions of Ifo’s World Economic Survey
(WES) about a country’s confidence in economic
policy as well as about the extent of which the cli-
mate of foreign investors is influenced by a country’s
legal/administrative restrictions for foreign firms to
invest and/or to repatriate profits.
Fiscal Burden
Fiscal Burden contributes to the overall Institutions
Climate Index with 16.7 percent. This sub-index
measures the extent to which the government diverts
resources away from private and possibly more pro-
ductive use. We proxy a country’s fiscal burden by
the  total tax revenue as percentage of a country’s
GDP. The component is a good measure of how
extensive a tax system of a country is. Direct taxes
might be low, but the government might alternative-
ly generate revenues from indirect taxes as well as
from a host of alternative fees and hidden taxes.The
revenue section is thus perhaps the best measure of
the negative impact of the size of the government
that has been highlighted by Barro (1990).
Human Capital Efficiency
The importance of human capital as a driver of eco-
nomic growth was acknowledged in economics at
least since the seminal papers of Lucas (1988) and
Romer (1990). Human capital can either act as a fac-
tor of production in the technology sector (Romer,
1990) or it can facilitate the adoption of technology
diffusion (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and
Spiegel, 1994). Our measure of Human Capital
Efficiency receives a weight of 14.9 percent in the
overall index. Figure A4 displays the composition of
the Human Capital Efficiency sub-index.The tertiary
gross enrolment ratio is the number of pupils enrolled
in tertiary, regardless of age, expressed as a percent-
age of the population of the five-year age group fol-
lowing on from the secondary school leaving age.The
average years of schooling of adults is the years of
formal schooling received,on average,by adults over
age 15. The secondary gross enrolment ratio is the
number of pupils enrolled in secondary, regardless of
age, expressed as a percentage of the population in
the theoretical age group for secondary education.
Finally, total public educational expenditure is mea-
sured as the current and capital expenditures on edu-
cation by local, regional and national governments,
including municipalities,expressed as a percentage of
the gross domestic product (GDP).
Trade Openness 
The positive impact of a countries openness towards
other countries on growth was empirically shown e.g.
by Sachs and Warner (1995).7 Trade promoting poli-
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cies do not only yield benefits from specialization
and facilitate the adoption of technology from other
countries but as Hall and Jones (1999, p. 98) point
out: “tariffs, quotas, and other trade barriers [also]
create lucrative opportunities for private diversion”.
Thus, Hall and Jones include a measure of openness
in their index of institutional quality.Our measure of
the degree of Trade Openness contains the following
components (see Figure A5): tariffs contains infor-
mation about the revenues from taxes on interna-
tional trade as a percentage of exports plus imports,
the mean tariff rate as well as the standard deviation
of tariff rates (Fraser Institute 2006). The variable
trade size measures the actual size of the trade sector
compared to expected size. It then allocates higher
ratings to countries with large trade sectors com-
pared to what would be expected, given their popu-
lation, geographic size, and location. On the other
hand, countries with small trade sectors relative to
the expected size receive lower ratings (Fraser
Institute 2006).The component black market premi-
um assesses the difference between official exchange
rate and black market rate.This component allocates
the highest rating to countries without a black-mar-
ket exchange rate; i.e., those with a domestic curren-
cy that is fully convertible without restrictions.When
exchange rate controls are present and a black mar-
ket exists, the ratings will decline toward zero as the
black market premium increases toward 50 percent.
The lowest rating is given when the black market
premium is equal to, or greater than, 50 percent
(Fraser Institute 2006).
Labor Markets
Rigid labor markets or tight regulations might pre-
vent an economy to react to technological changes
and allocate labor to the most productive use and
hence distort growth. Further, other institutional
arrangements that affect the labor market such as
the pension system, retirement age or family policy
or child care can lead to the exclusion of whole
groups of the population from the labor market and
thereby from production. Figure A6 displays the
components and respective weights of our sub-index
Labor Markets. The early retirement index is con-
structed as 1 minus the male labor force participa-
tion rate of age 55-64. A country receives a higher
value the lower the early retirement index.The index
of  labor market regulations combines information
about the impact of minimum wage,hiring and firing
practices, the share of labor force whose wages are
set by centralized collective bargaining, unemploy-
ment benefits and the use of conscripts to obtain mil-
itary personnel (Fraser Institute 2006). Finally, the
female labor participation rate is also included. This
component proxies for the obstacles existing within
a country that prevent women from actively partici-
pating in the labor market.
Structure of Government Expenditures
We assume that output diverted to government
expenditures captures the cost of government in a
society. When a government expends money, it
acquires resources, diverting them away from poten-
tially more productive private choices of resource
allocations (Fraser Institute 2006). Our sub-index
Government Expenditures is measured as general
government consumption spending as percentage of
total consumption as well as government enterprises
and investment as percentage of total investment,see
Figure A7.
Capital Markets
The beneficial effect of capital markets or financial
intermediation on economic performance was found
e.g. in the influential contribution of Levine, Loayza
and Beck (2000).8 Financial intermediation is seen to
help (i) production of ex ante information about
possible investments, (ii) monitoring of investments
and implementation of corporate governance, (iii)
trading, diversification, and management of risk, (iv)
mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v)
exchange of goods and services.Aghion, Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005) additionally stress the impor-
tance of financial intermediation for the rate of tech-
nology diffusion. The preferred proxy for financial
intermediation is usually the ratio of private credit to
GDP (see Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Levine 2005). Our
measure of Capital Markets or financial intermedia-
tion is comprised of private sector domestic credit as
percentage of GDP and capital market controls (see
Figure A8). Private sector domestic credit refers to
financial resources provided to the private sector,
such as through loans, purchases of non-equity secu-
rities, and trade credits and other accounts receiv-
able, that establish a claim for repayment (WDI
2006). Capital market controls assesses the access of
citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access
to domestic capital markets as well as restrictions on
8 For a comprehensive summary of the recent evidence see Levine
(2005).the freedom of citizens to engage
in capital market exchange with
foreigners (based on the 13 IMF
capital controls categories)
(Fraser Institute 2006).
The Institutional Climate and
Economic Growth
Our index is composed with the
expressed intent to highlight the
key underlying variables that
determine economic per capita
growth. After composing the
Institutions Climate Index we
are therefore interested how well
the index predicts economic growth across OECD
countries.We focus on the 4-year moving average to
filter out the business cycle variations. The OECD
GDP per capita growth rate is simply the un-weight-
ed average of the growth rate of the 24 countries
included in our analysis. The Institutions Climate
Index for OECD countries is the un-weighted aver-
age of the individual country Index values. Figure 2
shows the 4-year moving average of OECD per capi-
ta GDP (left hand scale) and the Institutions
Climate Index (right hand scale).
Figure 2 shows how remarkably well the Index
tracks the average OECD GDP per capita growth
rate.This is especially stunning, since the calibration
of the Index weights is based on three cross sections
only (1994, 1998, 2002). The Index values for post
2002 are out of sample predictions. Moreover, as
pointed out above we use two period lagged institu-
tions to predict growth.Thus, the Index value of for
example the year 2000 is based on institutional indi-
cators of the year 1998.
One exception to the overall well tracking of growth
rates of the Index is the year 2002. From the year
2001 to 2002 we observe a sharp increase in the
Index, while average OECD GDP growth declined.
After this one instance of diverging trends the index
and OECD growth again co-move for the rest of the
periods.A deeper analysis of the sources reveals that
this increase was driven by a surge in the Openness
sub-index – and in particular in the tariffs and trade
size indicators in many of the European countries.
Since the index values in 2002 relate to institutions in
2000,we conclude that the upswing in the trade vari-
ables is related to the introduction of the Euro in the
EU countries which, however, did not generate the
expected (in terms of index projection) upswing of
the growth rate.
Conclusion
A consensus has formed in the recent empirical
growth literature that strong explanatory power can
be attributed to institutional variables in the global
sample of countries.To date, however, the impact of
institutions on economic growth in OECD countries
has not been systematically explored.We identify an
array of endogenously selected and weighted eco-
nomic indicators that are combined into one index of
institutional quality for OECD countries. We show
that this Institutions Climate Index is able to track
average OECD growth over the period 1994-2006
remarkably well. The Index can be used to analyze
and understand the differential economic perfor-
mance of OECD countries.
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A7: Structure of Government Expenditures
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Private domestic 
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A8: Capital Markets